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Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes Vickie Langohr
In a provocative article, Thomas Carothers offered a corrective to common ways of thinking about liberalizing authoritarian regimes. At the height of a worldwide wave of liberalizations in the early 1990s, optimistic assumptions that any liberalizing regime was in transition to democracy led observers to count as many as one hundred countries that were expected to become democratic. By 2002 no more than twenty had moved beyond tentative liberalizations to institute meaningful political competition. The other four-fifths, including countries in Central America, Africa, and the former Soviet Union, "have not achieved relatively well-functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever democratic progress they have made." ' Carothers' argument is important not only for democratization studies but also as an invitation to rethink the role of Arab liberalizations within them. Discussions of the global "waves" of democratization routinely single out the Arab world as impervious to democratization, and Arab cases are generally ignored in scholarly research. It is often forgotten that in or before the optimistic early 1990s several Arab regimes, like their counterparts in eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, engaged in serious liberalization. That their efforts did not lead to meaningful democratization does not make the Arab world a democratic outlier; rather, it is part of a larger trend in which most recent moves away from authoritarianism have faltered. The Arab world may have specific conditions, from the role of Islam in politics to exceedingly high levels of exogenous rents, that have hampered its progress; the existence of only one Arab democracy, Lebanon, supports this possibility. However, the faltering of most transitions worldwide in this period suggests that more widely generalizable factors, such as the weakness of opposition parties and specific electoral arrangements, may also be at work.
A key trend in many Arab liberalizing regimes over the past decade has been the rise of advocacy nongovernmental organizations to the position of primary opposition to authoritarianism against the almost complete marginalization of opposition parties. While insufficient or reversed liberalization measures have minimized the position of opposition parties, liberalization also created the conditions for Arab par-ticipation in a larger trend: the proliferation of human rights, women's, and environmental groups.2 With effective opposition parties all but nonexistent, advocacy nongovernmental organizations have become the most vocal secular opposition in several Arab countries. They are also assuming roles, from defending the economic interests of workers and farmers to calling for the replacement of incumbent regimes, that typically are played by opposition parties. Studies of the role of civil society and nongovernmental organizations in democratization have generally treated nongovernmental organizations as entities completely distinct from parties.3 They have attributed different functional roles to the two types of groups and assumed that they attract different types of activists. These Arab cases suggest that both nongovernmental organizations and parties should be seen as part of a larger topography of opposition. In this approach opposition is perceived as being somewhat free-floating. The presence or absence of political and financial opportunities-for example, greater restrictions on one type of associational activity than on another or the availability of funds for nongovernmental organizations but not for parties-significantly influences what organizational form opposition takes. However, all forms are not created equal. The assumption of the leading opposition role in several liberalizing Arab regimes by advocacy nongovernmental organizations decreases chances for democratization. These organizations generally advocate the interests of a specific group or the importance of a particular principle, such as respect for human rights, making them ill-equipped to mobilize a much broader set of constituencies around the larger goal of regime change. Perhaps most important, as groups almost entirely dependent on foreign funding, they often have strong support abroad but shallow roots at home, allowing them to be more easily discredited by hostile governments than parties would be, particularly in the environment of profound Arab suspicion of western interests in the region after September 11, 2001 . In this climate, it is time for scholarly and policy analysis of Arab democratization to focus less on nongovernmental organizations and more on the importance of developing viable political parties. 4 Increasing centrality of advocacy nongovernmental organizations and decreasing relevance of parties in the opposition to liberalizing Arab presidential systems is most pronounced in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority. Opposition parties would need to become the key locus of democratization efforts for democratization to be successful because advocacy nongovernmental organizations, even at their strongest, are not equipped to carry out successful campaigns for democratization. The mobilization of nongovernmental organizations against restrictive association laws in Egypt in 1999 is a particularly useful case to demonstrate the weakness of advocacy group campaigns for democratization. Egyptian nongovernmental organizations were better positioned to succeed in such a campaign than many of their Arab counterparts. Egypt has one of the longest histories in the Arab world of formally organized voluntary associational activity, beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century. It has also had the longest period of liberalization; voluntary associations, choked off by authoritarian rule in the 1950s and 1960s, once again became active in the late 1970s, a full decade before most other liberalizing Arab countries. Finally, the campaign of Egyptian nongovernmental organizations in 1999 against the restrictive association law had high profile support from western donors and governments. Such support can be crucial in maintaining the freedom of nongovernmental organizations to operate in authoritarian contexts.5 It has not been as pronounced in many other liberalizing Arab regimes. Despite these facilitating conditions, Egyptian nongovernmental organizations' attempts to mobilize for associational freedom and to expand their campaign to encompass more fundamental regime change failed, powerfully demonstrating the limits on what Arab advocacy nongovernmental organizations can be expected to achieve in the battle for democratization.
Nongovernmental Organizations as Opposition: Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt Blessed with two attributes commonly cited as key facilitators of democracy, high literacy rates and a large middle class, Tunisia appeared poised to democratize successfully when interior minister Zein al-Abdin Ben Ali overthrew president Habib Bourguiba in 1987 and announced plans for a more democratic Tunisia.6 Amnesties of political prisoners and abolition of the lifetime presidency soon followed.7 Opposition parties, which began to break away from the ruling party in the late 1970s but had not been allowed seats in the parliament, became more prominent, as new parties were founded and government subsidies defrayed campaign costs.8 At Ben Ali's invitation, the government, representatives of the eight recognized opposition parties, and national labor, human rights, and women's organizations engaged in spirited negotiations and eventually signed a national pact outlining a general consensus on Tunisia's national identity and commitment to democracy.
That commitment has not been realized. In the first elections under the new regime, the Islamist Renaissance Party (MTI) was denied recognition. When members ran as independents, they won 14.5 percent of the vote, more than three times as much as the next largest opposition party, but the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD) was awarded all of the seats.10 The MTI was subsequently forbidden to contest elections, and its members have been subjected to continued police repression." With the MTI out of the way, the RCD chose to ensure a minimum of opposition party representation by not contesting a certain number of seats in the 1994 and 1999 elections. In both of these tightly controlled contests the opposition parties won the exact number of seats left uncontested; the RCD won 88 and 81 percent of the seats, respectively.12 While political parties were rendered all but irrelevant to opposition politics, human rights groups became some of the loudest opposition voices. The Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH in French), founded in 1977, was the first human rights group in the Arab world. When the regime jailed and tried Islamist activists in military tribunals in 1991 and 1992, LTDH was its most outspoken critic. The regime attempted to silence LTDH by forbidding associations to have party leaders on their boards, as LTDH had, and mandating that they accept all interested parties as members, which LTDH feared would lead the government to weaken its message by flooding it with ruling party supporters.13 LTDH assumed a lower profile until October 2000, when it elected a much more outspoken leadership, including a board of directors without a single member of the ruling party and a secretary general fresh from several years' imprisonment on political charges. The "new," more oppositional LTDH joined the National Council on Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT), founded in 1998 by LTDH defectors dissatisfied with its earlier conciliatory approach, in speaking out against violations of the rights of nonviolent Islamists, particularly the MTI. The regime responded with a court ruling suspending LTDH's newly elected board, the ransacking of the office of a CNLT founder, and denial of permission to travel abroad to several CNLT members.14 Like Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority since its inception in 1994 has had ineffective secular opposition parties, and nongovernmental organizations have become the main secular opposition to Yasser Arafat's regime. The new advocacy nongovernmental organizations, particularly human rights groups, quickly took on the most sensitive issues of the day. While unambiguously rejecting Islamist militants' use of violence, human rights groups called for due process and an end to torture. They played an equally pronounced role in defending the interests of those hurt by structural adjustment. The National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP), the closest thing Egypt has to a workers' and peasants' party, could not meaningfully resist the reversal of land reform, which stipulated that plots distributed to peasants in the 1950s and early 1960s would be returned to their original owners within five years unless the original owners agreed to sell or rent to the current owners. With few seats in parliament, the NPUP and allied parties could not have stopped the law's passage. But as the Arab Strategic Report, produced by Egypt's most well-regarded think-tank, points out, the NPUP and others could have used the five-year interim period to seek the law's amendment or to provide direct services to their peasant members. They did neither; the head of the NPUP peasants' section admitted that the party did not start work on the question until shortly before the law's final stages were to go into effect.32 A relatively new nongovernmental organization, the Land Center for Human Rights, instead provided key services to these peasants, documenting abuses of the law and seeking redress, particularly compensation for permanent structures that peasants had built. The Strategic Report argues that the NPUP could have provided precisely this type of service to ameliorate its members' plight.
As nongovernmental associations strove to protect the interests of peasants, other new organizations sought to strengthen the ability of workers to mobilize against structural adjustment. A leading former trade unionist founded the Center for Trade Union and Workers Services in 1995, and the following year 135 workers resorted to the Center for Human Rights Legal Aid (CHRLA) when the government prevented them from running in union elections.33 CHRLA has defended entire classes of workers who contend they were illegally fired from their jobs.34 This type of work brought human rights groups very close to assuming the role that leftist political parties normally played. Programmatically, some of this work is designed to bolster workers' attempts to overturn structural adjustment laws. These groups also function clientelistically through their work, as workers and farmers who might be expected to seek the help of a left or populist party turn to human rights groups to defend their interests. This financial context helps to explain why some Palestinian secular opposition groups have acted largely through nongovernmental organizations rather than parties. Palestinian leftist factions developed associations and sought foreign funding for them because of Fatah's refusal to support them. Opportunities for associational activity abounded, but it was deemed ideologically unacceptable to run for parliament. Thus, these groups turned factional nongovernmental organizations into vehicles for secular left opposition, as in the case of a prominent West Bank refugee rights association. This group started out as part of a larger Israeli-Palestinian documentation center staffed largely by PFLP members. Because of factional strife within the center, its refugee rights work was broken off in a separate unit, headed by a PFLP board of trustees that had not previously worked on refugee issues. While the center's staff insisted on its nonpartisan nature and refused to become a PFLP satellite, the board perceived the new refugee rights center as an arm of the PFLP and tried to divert some of the group's $175,000 budget, donated largely by European nongovernmental associations.52 Only after the association's staff resorted to the Palestinian ministry of the interior and the high court was it able to establish itself as a nonpartisan refugee advocacy group.
Why
Opposition parties' political and financial weakness is not the only reason many activists work through advocacy organizations rather than parties. Some human rights activists are former members of leftist parties whose persecution by authoritarian regimes convinced them that working to establish the rule of law is more pressing than advancing a party agenda. Similarly, several of the leaders of the new generation of women's advocacy associations are former members of leftist parties who experienced enough sexism within the parties that they decided that women's liberation could best be sought through groups focusing primarily on women's issues. 53 The result of these choices, however, has been the location of key battles for democratization in the nongovernmental association sector rather than in political parties Law 32 required citizens wishing to form voluntary organizations (subsequently referred to as nongovernmental organizations) to obtain permission from the ministry of social affairs. Permission was often denied on vague grounds including determinations that the nongovernmental organization was not needed or was redundant. Once approved, nongovernmental organizations had to inform the ministry of all activities. They had to notify three government offices of the agenda and location of meetings and promptly file records of their proceedings. The law also closely regulated fundraising. Only membership dues and offerings given during religious services could be collected without ministry permission, and permits for other types of fundraising, including the foreign funds so central to nongovernmental advocacy organizations were frequently denied or significantly delayed.
While Law 32 could seriously hinder nongovernmental organizations, major sections of the voluntary sector nonetheless managed to function. Islamic voluntary associations, by far the largest category of nongovernmental organizations in Egypt, mostly escaped serious ministry harassment. 54 The most extensive study of Egyptian nongovernmental organizations found that they were the least likely of all associations to be dissolved for Law 32 violations.55 Because these associations provide desperately needed social services, the government was unlikely to hamper their activities seriously, and because many of them were at least partially funded by mosque collections, much of their fundraising was exempted from government oversight. Although advocacy associations were precisely the kind of association Law 32 was designed to stifle, they have also generally been able to function. Business associations, which support the current climate of liberalization and are wealthy enough to fund themselves through dues, find their activities unhindered by Law 32. More oppositional advocacy organizations such as human rights groups often avoided Law 32 entirely by registering themselves as civil companies, rendering them liable to taxation but granting them more freedom of operation.
Perhaps the two categories most obstructed by Law 32 were the handful of advocacy nongovernmental organizations that had registered as voluntary associations, including the two leading environmental associations, and nonreligious social service and development associations. Lack of government sympathy for the goals of some of these groups was sometimes the problem, but a more frequent obstacle was the glacial rate at which the ministry processed the foreign funding on which they depend, even when there is no political intent to hamper the association's activities.56
The government's decision in early 1998 to replace Law 32 with Law 153 was motivated by a desire to lessen restrictions on "good" (apolitical) nongovernmental organizations while severely limiting the activities of oppositional advocacy organizations. International donor discourse about the centrality of social service organizations in compensating for government service cutbacks during structural adjustment appealed to the government, and international donors had long called for a less restrictive law. The American Agency for International Development, which donated $410 million to Egyptian nongovernmental organizations between 1976 and 2001, recommended less restrictive legislation and in the late 1990s offered the government several million dollars, which it declined, as technical assistance in revamping the law.57 Other foreign donors, particularly the Netherland Organization for International Development Cooperation, were equally outspoken. Law 153 responded to these concerns somewhat by reducing reporting requirements and increasing nongovernmental organizations' freedom to raise money domestically.
While the government sought to simplify regulation of apolitical nongovernmental organizations, it also clearly intended to use the new law to stifle oppositional advocacy groups, particularly those that had previously escaped the ministry's purview by registering as civil companies. Law 153 retained many of its predecessor's most regressive aspects; it allowed the ministry to dissolve associations and required ministry permission before accepting foreign funds. It added an article requiring advocacy groups registered as civil companies to register as nongovernmental organizations or face dissolution, while maintaining the Law 32 article forbidding recognition of nongovernmental organizations engaged in "political" or syndicate activity, a combination that convinced many advocacy organizations that the government intended to forbid them outright.
Leaders For the next several months the campaign proceeded quietly. Nongovernmental organizations from twelve of Egypt's twenty-seven governorates came together to form the Civic Forum, which joined the two key groups threatened by the law-apolitical, nonreligious social service and development associations that had suffered from Law 32 and feared Law 153 and advocacy organizations. Large Civic Forum meetings were held to air grievances, and four members of parliament attended a meeting in October 1998 and promised that open hearings on the law would be held before it was submitted for a vote.58 The Civic Forum and human rights organizations produced several studies detailing the flaws of the new law and distributed them to lawmakers. In January 1999 a new version of Law 153, which the advocacy organization representatives on the committee deemed a real improvement, emerged from the drafting committee. Further steam was added to the reform campaign when the state council, a judicial body charged with reviewing the bill's constitutionality before it went to parliament, explicitly argued that refusal to register nongovernmental organizations on the grounds that they were politically active was illegitimate. 59 The early successes of the campaign-in an authoritarian regime that strictly controlled the opposition-were impressive. It was highly unusual to delay submission of the law to parliament to allow more discussion and to agree to include representatives of nongovernmental organizations on the drafting committee. There was at least the possibility that a parliament dominated by the ruling majority might actually respond to nonelite constituents. These early successes strongly suggested a split within the government on associational freedom issues. While it was provocative enough to call on international organizations to blacklist the Egyptian regime, the statement went well beyond attacking Law 153 by calling on nongovernmental organizations to spearhead fundamental political change. Noting the inability of parties, syndicates, and unions to work for change due to government restrictions, the Geneva statement said that its signatories would initiate dialogue with other civil society actors to draw up a plan for complete political reform in Egypt which they would present to the president. It concluded with the following memorable lines: "the day that the executioners.. .congratulate themselves, imagining that their horrible deeds against the Egyptian citizen have gone unseen, that day will never come. It may take a long time, but there is no doubt that the day is coming when they will be held accountable.. .let them remember well what happened to the executioner Pinochet."63 At this point dissension began to break out openly among the human rights groups. Several of them issued a statement dissociating their groups from plans to open offices in Geneva on the grounds that the real fight for human rights had to be waged within Egypt. In the days between the two statements, some maneuvering within individual human rights groups had apparently gone on, as two of the groups that had signed the earlier statement now signed the counterstatement. The stakes continued to be raised, as four women from two human rights groups began a hunger strike demanding that the parliament honor its promise to hold public hearings before the law was passed. On May 25, with protesters demonstrating outside the parliament, Law 153 passed and was signed by Mubarak the next day.
At this point human rights groups anticipated the arrival of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. During the campaign some advocacy groups had taken the position that, if Law 153 passed, they would not register under it. Others said that they would continue fighting it but would be forced to register, lest they be forcibly closed. No decision had to be made immediately, as the deadline for registration was twelve months later. In the days immediately before Robinson's arrival in early June, however, eight women's and human rights organizations submitted notice of their intent to register. When Robinson arrived, she met with Mubarak to express her concern about the broad language of the law and promised to continue to follow the law's implementation closely. However, she also noted her satisfaction that nongovernmental organizations had been consulted and that the government had promised to continue such consultation in formulating the law's administrative regulations. Outraged, groups that had not registered charged that the registered groups played into the government's hands; their agreement to register, it was alleged, was read by Robinson as a sign that the law could not have been all that bad since the nongovernmental organizations had not taken a united stand against it. Robinson's departure signaled that the last card in the human rights groups' hand had been played. The game was lost.
What Went Wrong? Disagreement on the Limits of Nongovernmental Organizations
It is not surprising that a government that silenced political parties, professional syndicates, and trade unions also attacked nongovernmental advocacy organizations. Given the grossly uneven balance of forces, it is also not surprising that the government won. The anti-153 campaign, however, demonstrates some of the weaknesses of nongovernmental advocacy organizations as agents for fundamental democratic change. A key reason for their collapse was a pronounced lack of democracy and consultation both within individual human rights groups and among them. One of the most active human rights organizations split into two groups, with both sides arguing that the split was caused by the refusal of the other side to consult it about participation in the campaign. A founder of this organization filed papers signaling its intent to register under Law 153 in the days prior to Robinson's arrival without consulting his colleagues. This founder raised his own charges of undemocratic behavior within the organization. He contended that the Geneva statement was formulated by officials of one group and faxed to others with instructions that it be signed and returned immediately, leaving little time to discuss its implications or inflammatory language. When he insisted that the board as a whole discuss the wisdom of signing the statement, the director said that his position authorized him to sign on behalf of the organization and promptly did so. At least two other groups also charged that there was a lack of democratic consultation on the statement and that the names of their organizations had been signed without their permission.
The coalition also fractured over disagreement on the role that nongovernmental organizations, as opposed to parties, should play in opposing the government. Several heads of nongovernmental organizations that had shied away from the campaign's most controversial stances, refusing to endorse the Geneva statement and filing intent-to-register papers in the days preceding Robinson's arrival, contended that nongovernmental organizations were not strong enough to instigate a wider movement for regime change. One leader who had been involved in left party politics since the 1970s argued that human rights groups had not sufficiently realized the structural weakness of their position as they determined how to express their opposition to the regime. "We are not political parties. We haven't even finished building ourselves up yet." To his mind, human rights groups were not in position to bring the government down, nor should they be attempting to do so. There would be many other battles with the regime, and severely weakening the movement through an allout escalation over Law 153 was not a wise long-term strategy.64 The leader of another large human rights group shared this assessment, contending that the Geneva statement was inappropriately inflammatory. "Look at the (weak) position we are in. Are we in any position to be referring to Mubarak as Pinochet and threatening him with retribution? What power do we have to back this up with?"65 The question of whether human rights groups were right to frame their opposition to Law 153 in terms of regime reform rather than associational freedoms was raised at an October 2000 workshop designed to analyze the 1999 campaign. A director of a youth and social services group suggested that the advocacy organizations had been wrong to try to mobilize social service groups in the Civic Forum around a wider discourse of confrontation with the state rather than focus on the need to change Law 153. Charity organizations "are entirely outside the discourse of the state and of politics, and their issue is only MOSA" (that is, how to get what they need to operate without undue interference from the ministry of social affairs).66 Since these charity organizations had been the bulk of the Forum's membership, the implication was that the Forum's decision to place associational freedom in the wider context of democratization had been a mistake.
A third and fundamental reason for the weakness of the anti-1i 53 coalition was the almost total dependence of its members on foreign funding. Aside from an early and quickly aborted attempt by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights to become a mass membership organization and fund itself through dues, most advocacy organizations have made little attempt to raise funds locally. Some activists argue that ministry regulations prevent them from doing so.67 Others share the fundamental conviction, expressed in a book issued by the Civic Forum during the campaign, that in a society as poor as Egypt's nongovernmental organizations will never be able to fund themselves.68 By not relying on local funding, however, advocacy organizations have no constituency to which they are accountable in Egypt and only a limited number of people there who are personally invested in their success. When the government attempts to shut them down, these advocacy nongovernmental organizations find few supporters. This problem is compounded by strong public feelings that foreign funding for advocacy organizations is illegitimate. These feelings arise partially from a concerted government barrage of arguments that these groups are selling Egypt out for personal benefit, a charge that carries weight when many nongovernmental associational leaders have enjoyed a significant improvement in their standard of living through nongovernmental work. In this environment, an anti-153 campaign that focused heavily on limiting ministry restrictions on foreign funds was guaranteed a narrow audience. As one activist in the campaign admitted, "most people see that we receive money from abroad and they think that when we oppose government restrictions on this funding we do this because we have something to hide."69 Four years after the defeat of the anti-153 coalition, Egyptian advocacy organizations' freedom of operation is still severely curtailed. A year after its passage Law 153 was declared unconstitutional, primarily on the technical ground that it had not been approved by the necessary bodies prior to passage. In 2001 the regime responded with Law 84, which on some levels represented an improvement by narrowly defining the political activity in which nongovernmental organizations were forbid-den to engage and mandating representation of nongovernmental organizations on committees arbitrating conflicts between these organizations and the ministry of social affairs. In many other ways, however, Law 84 was worse. Access to foreign funding was further restricted. In previous laws nongovernmental organizations had been allowed to accept money from foreign agencies already in the country without prior ministry permission, but now all such funding required permission. The new law also continued its predecessors' insistence that the ministry, not the courts, had the right to dissolve nongovernmental organizations, and it allowed the ministry to freeze the funds of nongovernmental organizations that joined nongovernmental association networks, including international networks, without its permission.
Law 84 was passed in much the same way as its predecessor, although with much less formal input from the nongovernmental associations. Two brief meetings were held between the new minister of social affairs and associational representatives, but the latter complained that, as with Law 153, all of their suggestions were ignored. The protests of several opposition party members of parliament that the law was unacceptable went unnoticed, and the law was passed over a single weekend.
Conclusion
Many students of politics in the global south have argued that civil society generally and nongovernmental advocacy organizations in particular can play central roles in fostering democratization. It is certainly true that these organizations can call attention to and sometimes limit the depredations of authoritarian rule by publicizing abuses such as the torture of political prisoners and limitations on free speech. They can also help lay the foundations of a democratic culture by disseminating values essential to democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law. Beyond these contributions, however, lies the Herculean task of replacing current authoritarian regimes with democratic ones. Groups seeking to challenge authoritarian rule require widespread popular support, and nongovernmental advocacy organizations, which are typically single issue groups with small local constituencies dependent entirely on foreign largesse, are ill-equipped to lead the charge.
While most political scientists would find the argument that parties are better suited to challenge authoritarian regimes than nongovernmental organizations unexceptionable, they have paid little attention to the conditions under which opposition is routed through these organizations rather than parties. As Egypt and the Palestinian Authority demonstrate particularly clearly, often the same people, particularly leftist activists, move back and forth between party and nongovernmental activity in response to increasing or decreasing constraints on one or the other. While the effects of the availability of foreign funding on the proliferation of nongovernmental associations have been widely recognized by scholars and practitioners, the contrast between readily available funds for associations and the poverty of many parties and the implications of this contrast for the forms that opposition takes have rarely been studied. Similarly, the laws accompanying liberalization need to be scrutinized to determine the relative degrees of freedom they afford both nongovernmental organizations and political parties. Applying general principles of institutional analysis to the question of opposition weakness by examining the way in which institutions, political and financial, structure choices to oppose authoritarianism through nongovernmental organizations or parties would be an important first step in understanding the weakness of oppositions in the Arab world and elsewhere.
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